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"We live by symbols.... .
I.

INTRODUCTION

One hundred and thirty years after its end, the Civil War continues powerfully to influence the American South. The legacy of
"The War of Northern Aggression" (or, more dispassionately, "The
War Between the States") is pervasive in southern politics, history,
. This title is derived from the official flag of the Confederacy from 1863 to
1865, which was commonly known as "The Stainless Banner." See DEvERAuX D.
CANNON, JR., THE FLAGs OF THE CONFEDERACY, AN ILLUSTRATED HSTORY 13-21 (1988).
The Stainless Banner consisted of a white field with the Confederate battle flag in
the upper-left corner. See id. at 19; see also infraAppendix, Figure 1.
Law Clerk to The Honorable William W. Caldwell, United States
District
Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. B.A., Swarthmore
College, 1989;J.D., The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University, 11996.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECr.D LEGAL PAPERs 270 (1920). See generally
ANNE NORTON, REPUBLIC OF SIGNS: LIBERAL THEORY AND AMERICAN PoPuLAR CULTURE

(1993) (examining the role of semiotic signs in American society).
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and culture.2 The most vivid symbol of that legacy-the Confederate
battle flag, commonly known as the rebel flags-- is found everywhere
in the South; it is displayed outside of homes and on pickup trucks,5
reproduced on clothing,6 waved at school athletic events, 7 flown over
public buildings, 8 and, in Georgia and Mississippi, incorporated into
official state flags.9
The display of the Confederate flag, whether by private citizens'0
or by government," has been controversial. The courts have had a
2

See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Enduring Symbols of the Confederacy Divide the South

Anew, N.Y. TIMS,Jan. 27, 1993, at A16; Peter Baker, Virginians Still Held in Thrall by
the War Between the States, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1995, at DI; Susan Laccetti, A Bumper
Crop of Flags: Besieged BannerFindsNew Friends,ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 7, 1994, at A5.
The Confederacy actually had a number of official flags. See generally CANNON,
supra note *. The flag commonly associated with the Confederacy today was used as
the battle flag of a number of Confederate armies, including the Army of Northern
Virginia, see id. at 52-63, and was incorporated into the design of the Confederacy's
final official flags, first adopted in 1863. See id. at 18; see also infra Appendix, Figure
1.

See, e.g., Bell v. Mike Ford Realty Co., 857 F. Supp. 1550, 1559 (S.D. Ala.
1994); State v. Wynne, 406 S.E.2d 812, 814-15 (N.C. 1991); State v. Atkins, 399
S.E.2d 760, 763 (S.C. 1990); Kimberly Curtis & Ben Winton, Neo-Nazi Attack Alarms
Hispanics, PHOENIX GAZETTE, June 27, 1995, at Al, A8; Michael D. Shear, In Va., a
More Civil War Rages: Neither Side Gives Ground During Debate on Confederate Flag,
WASH. Posr, Mar. 19, 1994, at B3.
See, e.g., United States v. Three Juveniles, 886 F. Supp. 934, 938 (D. Mass.
1995); Two Black Teenagers Guilty in Confederate Flag Slaying, WASH. PoST, Jan. 13,
1996, at A6 [hereinafter Two Black Teenagers]; see also Fern Shen, Md. to Recall Auto
Tags with Confederate Flag,WASH. POST,Jan. 3, 1997, at Cl.
6 See, e.g., Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332,
1333 (6th Cir. 1972); Robert Tanner, FlagIgnites Battle in Southern Schools, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at A20.
See, e.g., Augustus v. School Bd., 507 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1975); RonaldJ.
Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political Correctness: Free Speech and Race
Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. Rzv. 1411, 1416 (1992) (discussing flag display at
University of Mississippi).
8 See, e.g., ConfederateFlag Stays, WASH. PosT, Feb. 19, 1995, at A12 (South Carolina state house); Phillip Rawls, Alabama Will Hoist Confederate Flags, TACOMA NEws
TRiB., Mar. 5, 1996, at A4 (state welcome centers); Shear, supra note 4, at B3 (city
museum, county dais; recently removed from county courthouse, state capitol).
9 See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1 (1994 & Supp. 1997); 1894 Miss. Laws 154; see
also
infraAppendix (providing illustrations of Confederate battle flag and the state flags
of Georgia and Mississippi).
10 See, e.g., Melton, 465 F.2d at 1333, 1335 (upholding suspension of student
from public school for wearing Confederate flag patch); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (D. Md. 1997) (display of Confederate flag on specialty license plate); Rychlak, supra note 7, at 1416 n.26 (citing articles discussing controversies over the Confederate flag at several colleges and
universities); Jerry Schwartz, Confederate Emblem Waves Amid Protest, N.Y. TIMm, Jan.
31, 1994, at C4; Tanner, supra note 6, at A20 (student suspended from public school
for wearing rebel flagjacket); Two Black Teenagers, supra note 5, at A6.
n See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 528 (11th Cir. 1997) (challenging
4
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mixed reaction to legal challenges, generally prohibiting the display
of the flag only where it is seen as part of a pattern of school segregation. Political pressure has led to retrenchment in some places and
change in others; for example, the flag remains an unofficial school
symbol at University of Mississippi sporting events," while Alabama
4
has discontinued the practice of flying the flag over its state house.'
Georgia and Mississippi, however, have chosen to keep the rebel
flag as part of their official state flags, despite recent controversy.
The Georgia flag has undergone particular scrutiny, both in a federal
court challenge 5 and as the subject of public debate during the 1996
Olympics in Atlanta.'6 The survival of these state flags is seen by
Georgia state flag), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1199 (1998); Augustus, 507 F.2d at 154
(display by public school); Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (N.D. Ga.
1995);Jackson v. Edgefield County, 650 F. Supp. 1176, 1184 (D.S.C. 1986) (display
by public school); Holmes v. Wallace, 407 F. Supp. 493, 494 (M.D. Ala. 1976)
(challenging Alabama's display of flag over state capitol), afj'd, 540 F.2d 1083 (3d
Cir. 1976); Blacks Sue Mississippi Over Flag: Activists Called the Confederate Design Insulting; The Governor Has Said There Are More Pressing Issues, ORLANDO SEIniNEL, Apr.
20, 1993, at A8 [hereinafter Blacks Sue]; Confederate Flag Stays, supra note 8, at A12
(lawsuit challenging South Carolina's display of flag over statehouse); Leonard
Shapiro, Georgia Flag Will Fly Despite Protest Plans; Gov. Miller Rules as Controversy
Grows, WASH. PosT, Jan. 27, 1994, at D1; Ronald Smothers, Board Bans GeorgiaFlag at
Atlanta Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at A14; S. Carolina Governor's Proposal to
Move Stars and Bars Opens Rift, CHI. TRiB., Nov. 27, 1996, at 19 [hereinafter S. Carolina Governor's Proposal];see also Rychlak, supra note 7, at 1416 (controversy over display of flag at University of Mississippi); Applebome, supra note 2, at A16 (Virginia
Governor Douglas Wilder's order to Virginia Air National Guard to remove Confederate battle flag from uniforms and aircraft); Peter Baker & Kent Jenkins, Jr.,
Flags Can Rap Back, North Learns,WASH.Posr, Sept. 29, 1994, at V3 (controversy surrounding senatorial candidate Oliver North's support for state display of flag);
Shear, supranote 4, at B3 (public display of flag in Virginia).
1
See, e.g., Augustus, 507 F.2d at 154-55; Smith v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd.,
448 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1971); Melton, 465 F.2d at 1333-35. Cf Coleman, 117
F.3d at 528-31; NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990).
is See, e.g., Raad Cawthon, "That Flag. That Song. That Rebel.," ATLANTA CONST.,
Apr. 9, 1995, at Cl; Roscoe Nance, Ole Miss Coach Looks Beyond Symbols, USA TODAY,
Nov. 9, 1992, at 8C; Rychlak, supra note 7, at 1416; Jeff Schultz, Rebel Cause: The
Confederate Legacy at Ole Miss is Long and Storied, and Many Rebel Fans Remain Unwilling to Change the School's Image, ATLANTAJ., Sept. 4, 1997, at Cl.
14 See Confederate Flag Removed in Alabama, WASH. PosT, Apr. 30, 1993, at A47
[hereinafter Confederate Flag Removed]. South Carolina is now the only state to display the rebel flag over its state house (other than Georgia and Mississippi, through
their state flags). See Confederate Flag Stays, supra note 8, at A12; see also Spencer S.
Hsu, Virginia Senate Votes to Retire the State Song, WAH. PosT, Jan. 29, 1997, at Al
(move to retire racially offensive reconstruction-era state song); infra notes 162-64
and accompanying text (outlining recent proposal to move flag from state house by
South Carolina's governor).
is See Coleman, 117 F.3d at 528.
16 See Flag Ban Upsets Georgia Official, WASH. PosT, June 28, 1996, at B4; Bert
Roughton Jr., Olympic Watch; Countdown to the Atlanta Games; Inside the Games,
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some as a testament to states' rights and southern heritage. The
premise of this Article is that the survival of the Georgia and Mississippi flags also represents a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The governmental adoption and display of a public symbol will
have profound equal protection implications. This Article considers
the analysis of public symbols under the Fourteenth Amendment,
utilizing both Supreme Court precedent and theoretical works examining systems of symbolism, communication, and identity. Part II of
the Article considers traditional equal protection doctrine and examines the application of this jurisprudence to the Georgia and Mississippi state flags. Part III explores the function of flags as public symbols, drawing on the work of literary and semiotic theorists, and finds
that public symbols are qualitatively different from traditional exercises of a state's police powers. Where a public symbol carries a message that is disproportionately viewed as racist and divisive by members of one racial group, it violates equal protection. Part IV
concludes that the Georgia and Mississippi state flags, as divisive
symbols of prejudice, segregation, and disenfranchisement, cannot
withstand Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny."'
In using what is traditionally viewed as academic theory to develop an approach to analyzing public symbols, I hope to do more
than just suggest that the Georgia and Mississippi flags violate equal
protection. Abstract theory is commonly regarded as useless to the
practicing lawyer.'" The theories that I employ in my analysisATLANTA CONST., Nov. 26, 1994, at B8; Ronald Smothers, Georgia Governor Acts to End
Confederate Symbol, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1992, at A12; see also Shapiro, supra note 11,

at DI (Georgia flag to fly at Super Bowl); Smothers, supra note 11, at A14 (AtlantaFulton County Recreation Authority decision not to display Georgia flag). More
recently, the Georgia flag was removed from a display of state flags outside of the
New York state capitol in Albany, after some legislators complained that the battle
flag's inclusion was offensive. See Georgia State Flag May Not Fly in Albany, ALBANY

TIMES UNION, Feb. 10, 1997, at B2.
11 See, e.g., Applebome, supra note 2, at A16; Shear, supra note 4, at B3; Tanner,
supranote 6, at A20.
1 For excellent discussions of the constitutional implications of the state display

of the rebel flag, see generally Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags,
Monuments, and State Holidays, and The Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicul-

tural Society, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1079 (1995) and James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving
Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flagfrom Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE LJ.

505 (1991).

19 See Madeleine Plasencia, Who's Afraid of Humpty Dumpty: Deconstructionist
Refer-

ences inJudicialOpinions, 21 S.ATrL U. L. REv. 215 (1997);John Batt, American Legal
Populism: A Jurisprudentialand HistoricalNarrative,Including Reflections on CriticalLe-

gal Studies, 22 N. Ky. L. Rzv. 651, 689 (1995); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudenceof Law and Practical
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Lauren Berlant's New Historicism,"0 Stanley Fish's reader-response
theory,2 and semiotic and post-structural analyses of linguistic systems-epitomize the academic writing derided by some as ivory
tower "parlor games."2' Understanding practical questions of symbolism and meaning, however, is far from intuitive. Theory that focuses on language and social meaning can lend crucial insight into
the function of public symbols like state flags. This Article, through
its use of both legal precedent and abstract theory in its discussion of
the Fourteenth Amendment, seeks to explore the potential for the
application of theory to the practice of law. 4
II.

THE STATE FLAGS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The state flags of Georgia and Mississippi explicitly incorporate
the Confederate battle flag into their designs. Two-thirds of the face
of Georgia's flag is filled with a rebel flag;25 the state statute adopting

the Georgia flag expressly provides that this portion of the flag "shall
be the same as the union of the flag of the Confederate States."
The Mississippi state flag has a rebel flag in its upper-left comer,
comprising approximately one-third of the flag's surface.1
The state adoption and display of these flags is questionable in
light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ...deny to any per-

Applications., 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 726-36 (1996). See generally Harry T. Edwards,
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MIc-I. L.
REV. 34 (1992). But see Ruth Colker, The Practice/Theomy Dilemma: PersonalReflections
on the LouisianaAbortion Case, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 1195 (1992) (discussing use of feminist theory in abortion case amicus briefs).
The dichotomy in perspectives on theory is illustrated by a comparative
WESTLAW search.
A March 4, 1998, search in the ALLCASES database
(containing federal and state case law) for words containing the root "deconstruct"
produced 101 hits, many of which use the term derisively. The same search in the
JLR database (containing journals and law reviews) produced 3159 hits, including
75 documents that include the term in their tides.
20 See infra notes 105-09 and
accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
See infranotes 127-32 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., David L. Gregory, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, 1987 DuKE L.J.
1138, 1143 (book review); Mark Kingwell, Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature?, 6
YALE L.J. & Hut.AN. 317, 320 (1994).
24 For a comprehensive discussion of the need
for jurisprudence that incorporates both theory and practice, see Sternlight, supra note 19, at 741-67.
25 See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1 (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also infra Appendix,
Figure 2.
26

GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1.

See 1894 Miss. Laws 154; see also infta Appendix, Figure 3.
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son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."28 Equal

protection prohibits not only state action that is expressly discriminatory, but also state action that is facially neutral but discriminatory

in both motivation and effect."
A.

ChallengingState FlagsIncorporatingthe Rebel Fag--Coleman
v. Miller

The constitutionality of Georgia's state flag was challenged recently in Coleman v. Miller." In Coleman, a Black-1 citizen of Georgia
argued that the state's adoption and display of the flag is racially discriminatory 2 and violates
33 his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Analyzing the state flag in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Hunter v. Underwood,34 the Coleman court rejected the equal protection challenge. 5 Under Hunter,a facially neutral" statute violates the
Fourteenth Amendment where (1) it was adopted for racially discriminatory reasons and (2) there is a present racially discriminatory
impact.37 While the district court concluded that the adoption of the
28 U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV,
30

§ 1.

See infra Part I.B (detailing the analysis of flags under Hunter v. Underwood).
117 F.3d 527, 528 (11th Cir. 1997). A 1993 lawsuit challenging Mississippi's

state flag has not led to any reported decisions. See Blacks Sue, supra note 11, at A8.
31 I have chosen to capitalize the terms "Black" and "White"
throughout this Article, in recognition of the significant roles these classifications play in America's
racial discourse. Capitalizing both terms also serves to emphasize the ways in which
polarizing symbols like the Confederate flag force individuals to define themselves
according to (often ill-fitting) racial generalizations. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L.
REv. 367, 369 n.3 (1996); Emily Field Van Tassel, "Only the Law Would Rule Between
Us". Antimiscegenation, the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate of Rights After
the Civil War, 70 CHI.-KRr L. Rzv. 873,875 n.5 (1995); see also Alex M.Johnson,Jr.,
How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: DestabilizingRace as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1595, 1596 n.8 (1995); Kimberle Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HAav. L. Rav. 1331, 1331 n.2 (1988); John M. Kang, Deconstructingthe Ideologp of White Aesthetics, 2 McH. J. RAC & L. 283, 286 n.2 (1997).
32 See Coleman, 117 F.3d
at 528.
" See id.
471 U.S. 222 (1985).
35 See Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530-31. The court also rejected the plaintiff's challene to the Georgia flag under the First Amendment. See id. at 531.
It seems clear that the statutes adopting the Georgia and Mississippi state flags
are facially neutral; neither expressly mentions race or creates any explicit classification based on race. See id. at 529.
37 See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227-28; Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Coleman, 117 F.3d at 529; see also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442
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Georgia flag was motivated, at least in part, by racism,- the court of
appeals rejected the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment challenge
because it could find no present disparate effect."9
In considering the disparate effect prong of the Hunter analysis,
the Coleman court required that the plaintiff "present specific factual
evidence to demonstrate that the Georgia flag presently imposes on
African-Americans as a group a measurable burden or denies them
an identifiable benefit."4* The court rejected the plaintiffs suggestion of disparate impact based on the flag's psychological effect on
the plaintiff and the plaintiff's perception of the flag as an antiBlack, pro-segregation symbol. In the absence of specific evidence
of measurable or identifiable disparate impact, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment challenge must fail.'
The Coleman court's emphasis on "specific factual evidence" of
"measurable" or "identifiable" harm43 is inappropriate. While it is
certainly true that Hunterand the cases that rely upon it generally involve discriminatory laws with some concrete effect," this is inextricably linked to the laws challenged in those cases. Requiring a
measurable effect may be appropriate where the challenged statute
implicates objectively measurable rights and privileges; a very different analysis is called for where the challenged state action is the
adoption and display of a public symbol such as a state flag.5
The Analysis of the Flags UnderHunter v. Underwood

B.

Hunter v. Underwood employed a two-part test for the analysis of
the constitutionality of laws that are facially neutral.47 The chalU.S. 256, 272 (1979).
The Coleman court evidently assumed that the adoption and display of a state
flag meets the "state action" requirement of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.
Se NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990).
See Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561, 1569, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(denying motion for preliminary injunction); see also infra Part II.B.l.a (discussing
the adoption of Georgia's flag). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit never reached the question of discriminatory intent in Co/eman. See
117 F.3d at 581 n.8.
39 See Co/eman, 117 F.3d at 530-31; see also infra Part lI.B.2 (outlining the disparate effect).
40 Coleman, 117 F.3d
at 580.
41
42

Seeid.
See id.

See id.
See infranotes 96-103 and accompanying text.
45 See infra Part III (discussing public symbols under the Fourteenth Amendment).
4

44

46

471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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lenged law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if the plaintiff can prove that racial discrimination was a
"'substantial' or 'motivating' factor behind enactment of the law""
and the law "produces disproportionate effects along racial lines."4 9
If both elements are proven, then the law must be struck down as
violative of equal protection.
The facts of Hunter provide a useful illustration. A provision of
Alabama's 1901 Constitution disenfranchised persons convicted of
"'any crime.. involving moral turpitude.'"50 This classification
tended disproportionately to affect Blacks.5 ' Historical evidence suggests that one of the principal goals of the 1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention was the disenfranchisement of Black freedmen. 2
In light of the provision's disparate impact, and in light of the evident racist intent of the 1901 constitutional convention, the Court
concluded that the disenfranchisement provision violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The provision's "original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race
and the section continues to this day to have that effect. As such, it
violates equal protection ... "54 Hunter now serves as a model for
equal protection analysis of facially neutral laws.
1.

RacialMotivation

Even if a law has a disparate impact on the members of a protected class, it does not violate equal protection unless some discriminatory motivation influenced its enactment.5 5 On this basis, the
Court has several times rejected Fourteenth Amendment challenges
to laws with discriminatory impact. This requirement is the result
47 See id. at 227-28. The Hunter test had been used earlier by the
Court in rejecting Equal Protection claims in Personnel Administration v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259,
272, 281 (1979), Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,

429 U.S. 252, 254, 264-65 (1977), and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 320
(1987).
48

49

Hunter,471 U.S. at 228.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 223 (quoting ALA. CONST. art. VIII,

51 See id. at 227.

§ 182).

See id. at 228-31.
See id. at 233.
Hunter,471 U.S. at 233.
55 See Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("[Elven
if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a
discriminatory purpose."); Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227-28; Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 271-72, 281; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265, 271.
5

53
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of "the settled rule that the57 Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
equal laws, not equal results."

It is important to note that to satisfy the intent requirement of
the Hunter test, race must be shown to have been a motivating factor
in the adoption of the law, not necessarily the motivating factor.'6
Once the plaintiff can establish that race was a motivating factor,
"the burden shifts to the law's defenders to demonstrate that the law
would have been enacted without this factor.""9 Unless the defender
of the statute in question can demonstrate that the statute would
have been passed even absent the discriminatory factor, the discrimination irredeemably taints the statute. 60 In ruling that the disenfranchisement provision of the Alabama Constitution violates
equal protection, the Court explained in Hunter that "an additional
purpose to discriminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose to discriminate against all blacks, and it is beyond
peradventure that the latter was a 'but-for' motivation for the enactment of [the provision in question]."'" The mere presence of some
intent to discriminate against Blacks satisfies the intent requirement
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
Historical context-the events surrounding the adoption of the
law-is highly relevant to the question of discriminatory intent."
The Hunter Court gave considerable weight to the testimony of historians and to historical works analyzing the 1901 Georgia Constitutional Convention and the post-Reconstruction era. 5 Uncovering
discriminatory intent may require consideration of both direct and
circumstantial evidence;" while legislative history may sometimes
provide clear and irrefutable evidence of an intent to discriminate,6
the absence of such damning evidence should not insulate a law
where the surrounding circumstances make clear that the law was
adopted for discriminatory reasons.6
Cf McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 299 (1987).
57 Feeney, 442 U.S.
at 273.
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227-28; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272; Arlington Heights, 429

U.S. at 265-66.
59 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228 (citing Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
60

See id.

61 Id. at 232.
62 See id. at 228-29; Arlington Heights, 429

U.S. at 267; McCleskey v. Kemp, 481

U.S. 279, 298 n.20 (1987).
63

65

66

See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228-32.
See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.

See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229-30.
See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374
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The Adoption of the Georgia State Flag

In a preliminary injunction proceeding early in the Coleman
case, the district court found that "discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" in the adoption of the Georgia state flag. 7 The court
reached this conclusion after an extensive review of the historical
facts surrounding the flag's adoption.
The Georgia state flag was adopted by the legislature in 1956."
The adoption of the new flag came during a racially charged period
in the South. One year earlier in 1955, the Supreme Court had decided Brown v. Board of Education,9 requiring the desegregation of all
public schools. Desegregation was met with considerable resistance
in Georgia, where then-Governor Marvin Griffin led "a policy of massive resistance to desegregation. " 7 This policy of "massive resistance"
was echoed in the 1956 session of the Georgia General Assembly:
Of the 150 acts passed in the 1956 session, ten bills and two resolutions dealt with massive resistance or segregation. One such
law was the interposition resolution, which purported to declare
the Brown cases and all similar decisions null and void. The resolution stated that in Brown the Supreme Court had usurped powers reserved to the states. It repudiated the Supreme Court's
right to declare state laws unconstitutional.7'
The bill proposing the adoption of the new state flag was intro7
duced "[w]ithin days of the interposition resolution's passage." 1
(1886).
67

Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

69

SeeGA. CODEANN. § 50-3-1 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
349 U.S. 294 (1955).

70 Coleman, 885 F. Supp. at 1566.
71 Id.; see also H.R. 185 (Ga. 1956), reprinted
in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 438 (1956)
(interposition resolution); H.R. 243 (Ga. 1956), reprinted in 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 421
(1956) (general appropriation act, providing that no public funds shall be used for
integrated schools); Act. 197 (Ga. 1956), reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 450 (1956)
(providing for both the forfeiture and discharge of retirement by state actors who
either refuse or fail to enforce segregation laws); Act 11 (Ga. 1956), reprinted in 1
RACE REL. L. REP. 481 (1956) (empowering governor to close public schools); Acts
13-14 (Ga. 1956), reprinted in 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 420 (1956) (providing for leasing
of public school property to private schools); Act 15 (Ga. 1956), reprinted in 1 RACE
REL. L. RzA. 424 (1956) (bringing private-school teachers into state teachers' retirement system); State Bd. of Educ. Res. (Ga. Mar. 21, 1956), reprinted in 1 RACE
REL. L. REP. 609 (1956) (regarding resolution of Georgia State Board of Education
seeking to discontinue retirement benefits of retired university professor for his
support of integration); BENJAMIN MuSE, TEN YEAs OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF
INTEGRATION SINCE THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION 56-72 (1964). See generally
FRAscis M. WILHorr, Tim Potncs oF MASSIVE REssrsANcE (1973); NuAN V. BARTEY,
THE RISE OF MAssrvE RESISTANcE (1969).
72 Coleman, 885 F. Supp. at 1566; Colemanv. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 528 (11th Cir.
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While the legislative history of the flag statute contains no discussion
of segregation or race relations, 73 one former member of the assembly testified in Coleman
that "the flag was adopted as a symbol of re74
sistance to Brown."
Despite the lack of evidence in the legislative history, the district
court in Coleman concluded that discriminatory purpose tainted the
adoption of the Georgia state flag.7- The court placed great emphasis on the prevalence of the desegregation debate in Georgia in 1956
and on the role that the rebel flag had come to play as a symbol for
White supremacy.6 The court concluded that "[t]he legislators who
voted for the 1956 bill [adopting the flag] knew that the new flag
would be interpreted as a statement of defiance against federal desegregation mandates and an expression of anti-black feelings. " 7 In
light of this evidence, the court found that the adoption of the new
flag was motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory
purpose, satis78
fying the intent prong of the Huntertest.
b.

The Adoption of the Mississippi State Flag.

The state flag of Mississippi was created by a special committee
appointed by the legislature in 1894. ° In the 1890s, the South was
experiencing a post-Reconstruction era of readjustment in which the
legacy of the Confederacy enjoyed a renewed popularity." This Con1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1199 (1998).
73 See Coleman, 885 F. Supp. at 1567;
Coleman, 117 F.3d at 528-29.
74 Coleman, 885 F. Supp. at 1567; see also Coleman, 117 F.3d at 529
n.4. The 1956
Georgia General Assembly had no Black members. See Coleman, 885 F. Supp. at
1567.
75 See Coleman, 885 F. Supp. at
1569.
76 See id; see also infra note
156.
77 Coleman, 885 F. Supp.
at 1569.
78 See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit never
reached this issue in Coleman. See 117 F.Sd at 531 n.8. This finding may to some
extent conflict with the conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit in 1990 that the display
of the Confederate battle flag over the Alabama state capitol was not motivated by
racism. See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990). Given the substantial similarity between the facts surrounding the adoption of the Georgia state
flag and the facts surrounding Alabama's display of the flag (Alabama raised the
flag on "April 25, 1963, the day that United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy traveled to Montgomery to discuss with then-Governor George Wallace the
governor's announced intention to block the admission of the first Black students
to the University of Alabama." Id. at 1558), it seems difficult to conclude that the
Hunt court's interpretation of the facts before it are consistent with Hunter or with
the historical record.
79See 1894 Miss. Laws 154; see also BENJAMIN F. SHEARER & BARBARA S. SHEARER,
STATE NAMES, SEALS, FLAGS, AND SYmBOLS: A HIsToRIcAL GUIDE 83 (1987).
90 See GAINES M. FOSTER, GHOSTS OF THE CONFEDERACy: DEFEAT, THE LOST CAUSE,
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federate revival had a pronounced impact on race relations. The
end of Reconstruction coincided with a resurgence in the spirit of
White supremacy." Mississippi drafted a new constitution in 1890,
designed in large measure to deny Blacks the vote.' The landmark
case of Plessy v. Ferguson,' validating the doctrine of separate but
equal, began in 1892 with the conviction of Homer A. Plessy for violating a Louisiana segregation law by riding in a Whites-only train
car."4 The Supreme Court, in considering a voting rights provision of
the Georgia Constitution of 1901, in Hunter characterized the 1901
Georgia Constitutional Convention as "part of a movement that
swept the post-Reconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks."85
The adoption of the Mississippi flag in 1894 must be viewed in
light of this era of pro-Confederate, anti-Black sentiment. A strong
parallel may be seen between the political climate of the 1890s and
that of the mid-1950s. In both eras, southern politics was dominated
by a defiance of federal control and a resurgent assertion of states'
rights. In both eras, this conflict centered around issues of race relations and the right of Whites to deny Blacks equal status in southern
society. The political issues of the 1890s were, if anything, more racially charged than those of the 1950s. The Mississippi Legislature of
the 1890s was not espousing a policy of "separate but equal"; in opAND THE EMERGENCE OFTHE NEW SOUTH,

1865-1913, at 104 (1987). The 1894 reun-

ion of the United Confederate Veterans (UCV) in Birmingham drew 20,000 attendees, the largest gathering of the UCV to date. See id. at 133. The decorations at
UCV reunions regularly included Confederate flags. See id. at 135.
8 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985); EDWARD L. AYERS, THE
PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 137-48 (1972). See generally THE AGE OF SEGREGATION: RACE RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH, 1880-1945 (Robert
Haws ed., 1978); RAYFoRD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OFTHE NEGRO (1954).
See AERS, supra note 81, at 146-49; EDWARD L. AYERS, SOUTHERN CROSSING: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTI, 1877-1906, at 103-04 (1995); 2 A HISTORY OF
MISSISSIPPI 13-14 (Richard Aubrey McLemore ed., 1973); THE SoUTH SINCE RECONSTRUCTION 149 (Thomas D. Clark ed., 1973). The August 27, 1890, Memphis Ap-

pea, as part of its coverage of the Mississippi Constitutional Convention, ran a headline reading, "White Supremacy-The One Idea of the Convention." HISTORY OF
MISSISSIPPI, supra, at 13-14.
The Mississippi Constitution of 1890 was adopted in the same era of White resurgence as the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which contained the voting rights
provisions found to violate the Equal Protection Clause in Hunter. See Hunter, 471
U.S. at 224; supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
83 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
84 SeeExpartePlessy, 11 So. 948, 949 (La. 1892), aff'd sub nom. Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). Railroad segregation laws were passed in nine southern states
between 1887 and 1891. See AvEs, supra note 81, at 137.
85 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229 (citing SHELDON HACKNEY, POPULISM TO PROGRESSMSM
IN ALABAMA 147 (1969); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OFTHE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913,
at 321-22 (1971)).
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posing Black suffrage, it sought to advance a policy unquestionably
designed to keep Blacks unequal. In light of the historical context
surrounding the adoption of each state flag, it seems clear that if the
Coleman court was correct in concluding that intent to discriminate
influenced the decision to adopt Georgia's state flag in 1956,86 then
discriminatory intent influenced the adoption of Mississippi's state
flag in 1894, satisfying the first prong of the Hunter test.
2. DisparateEffect
In addition to proof of discriminatory intent, invalidation of a
facially neutral law as violative of equal protection requires a showing
of discriminatory impact. The impact necessary to satisfy the test
has been described by the Supreme Court as "a disproportionately
adverse effect upon a racial minority."" The Court has suggested
that in equal protection challenges the disproportionate effect
prong of the test is secondary to the question of discriminatory intent: "[I]mpact provides an 'important starting point,' but purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that offends the Constitution.'" 89
"'Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.' 9°
In rejecting the equal protection challenge to the Georgia state
flag, the court of appeals in Coleman concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to "present specific factual evidence to demonstrate that the
Georgia flag presently imposes on African-Americans as a group a
measurable burden or denies them an identifiable benefit."9 ' On the
basis of this requirement, Coleman rejected the plaintiffs equal protection claim because the flag had caused him no directly provable
harm.9 ' While the court of appeals criticized the Georgia flag as offensive and divisive, it concluded that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence of a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. '
See Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (N.D. Ga. 1995); see also supra
Part II.B. l.a (discussing the adoption of the Georgia state flag).
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227; Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.

252, 264-65 (1977).
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
Id. at 274 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
16 (1971)) (citation omitted).
N Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
242 (1976)).
91 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct.
1199 (1998).
92

Seeid.

93

See id.
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The Coleman court based its rejection of the plaintiff's equal
protection claim on the contrast it perceived between the effect of
the flag and the impact of more concrete legislation such as the disenfranchisement provision considered in Hunter v. Underwood)'
Such an emphasis on concrete effect may make sense in the context
of equal protection cases that challenge laws that have a directly discernible impact on the citizenry, but is inappropriate in the analysis
of the impact of a public symbol like a state flag."
Most equal protection cases involve laws with immediate and
practical effect. Hunter, for example, concerned a state constitutional provision denying voting rights to persons convicted of certain
crimes; 6 a number of other equal protection cases also address voting rights questions. 7 Other common topics of equal protection
challenges include discrimination in public schools, housing and
zoning decisions," electoral redistricting,'0° the sentencing and
treatment of prisoners,"' public employment, 2 and jury selection.'
Most equal protection cases, therefore, involve statutes that will,
by their very nature, have a "measurable" effect on people's lives.
Laws and policies governing voting, education, housing, crime, and
employment are designed to have a discernible impact on the public; if such laws function in a discriminatory fashion, they will inevitably have a "measurable" discriminatory effect. A state flag, on the
See id. (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985)).
See infra Part III.B (analyzing public symbols under Hunter).
96 See Hunter, 471 U.S.
at 223.
97 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Comm'rs., 722 F. Supp. 380,
382 (E.D. Tenn.
1989); Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963, 965, 970 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
go See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973); Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534, 1538 (11th Cir. 1994); Hodges v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 864 F.
Supp. 1493, 1497 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d
1352, 1353 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181,
1184 (2d Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 254 (1977); Horizon House Dev. Serv., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aftd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
100 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 903 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 633 (1993); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 127 (1971); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53 (1964).
101 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282-83 (1987); Santiago v. Miles,
774 F. Supp. 775, 777 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
102 See, e.g., Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272 (1979); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1976); Green v. City of Montgomery, 792 F. Supp.
1238, 1243 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
103 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986); Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 400 (1945).
95
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other hand, functions as a public symbol. Its role, and therefore its
effect, is categorically different from ordinary legislative policymaking.
III. PUBLIC SYMBOLS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

A.

The Role of Public Symbols

Public symbols such as state flags play a unique role in American
society. Unlike statutes that carry forward the traditional "police
powers" of the states,'" legislative actions adopting public symbols
have results that are symbolic and ideological, not practical and concrete. The function of a symbol is to signify. What it signifies, and
how it does so, defines its effect on the public.
Lauren Berlant suggests that symbols are essential to our sense
of public identity; on a national level, "certain abstract signs and stories" function to relate all Americans to what Berlant calls the
"National Symbolic." °5 "[I]nscription in the National Symbolic"
through the recognition of public symbols serves to create a sense of
citizenship. 6 This sense of belonging helps to build communal confidence and health; without it, an individual will be left in a state of
roofless anxiety.
[D]isruptions in the realm of the National Symbolic create a collective sensation of almost physical vulnerability: the subject
without a nation experiences her/his own mortality and vulnerability because s/he has lost control over physical space and the
historical time that marks that space as part of her/his inheritance.

107

The Statue of Liberty, for example, as a symbol of opportunity
and freedom to new immigrants, functions to incorporate the nationless new arrival into the "Symbolic order" of American citizenship.'0 8 The American flag, according to Berlant, performs a similar
function; through its inclusive familiarity as a common symbol, it
gives its viewer a sense of belonging and understanding, a sense of
place in the national identity.'

A state's police powers are generally regarded as those powers pertaining to
public health, safety, and morals. See BLAC.K'S LAw DicnoNARY 1156-57 (6th ed.
1990).
L0 uzLAUREN
BERLANT, THE ANATOMY OF NATIONAL FANTAsy 20-21 (1991).
106 Id. at
24.
107 Id.
108 See id. at 26.

109 See id. at 168. See generallyJohn R. Quinn, The Lost Language of the Irshgaymae:
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This notion of the flag as common ground in the formation of a
sense of identity and citizenship has also been advanced by the Supreme Court. In its decision extending First Amendment protection
to flag burnings in Texas v.Johnson,"° the Court devoted considerable

energy to an analysis of the function of the American flag as a public
symbol. The official function of the flag is to serve as "a symbol of

nationhood and national unity.""'

"Causes and nations, political

parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of
their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design.""2 As the
Court later observed in another flag burning case, United States v.
Eichman,"s "at some irreducible level the flag is emblematic of the
Nation as a sovereign entity."" 4 This symbolism is rich and visceral:
"Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies this
Nation as does the combination of letters found in 'America. ' "11
Some evidence for the proposition that state flags play a similar
role may be seen in the ways in which they are enshrined by legislatures. Both Georgia and Mississippi have a variety of statutes pertaining to their state flags, including laws specifying how and when the
flags are to be displayed," 6 calling for the flags to be honored,"7 placing flags in the public schools"" (and, in Mississippi, mandating that
public school students study the state flag),"' and prohibiting the
Textualization in Ireland'sLaw and Literature (or the Most Hidden Ireland), 26 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 553 (1995) (examining the ways in which identity is a product of
social forces and exploring the power of signification to shape the individual).
10 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
I Id. at 410; see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In times of national crisis, [the flag] inspires and motivates the average citizen to make personal sacrifices in order to achieve societal
goals of overriding importance; at all times, it serves as a reminder of the paramount importance of pursuing the ideals that characterize our society.").
1
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319
U.S. 624, 632 (1943)).
11 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
114
115
16

Id. at 316 n.6.

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-3 (1994 & Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3-3-15

(1972 & Supp. 1997); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-10 (flag may be displayed for
decorative or patriotic purposes), § 50-3-8 (prohibiting use of national, state, and
Confederate flags for advertising).
1
See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1 (state militia to carry flag), § 50-3-2 (pledge of allegiance to state flag); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-7(2) (1972) (establishing pledge of
allegiance to state flag and requiring that it be taught in the public schools); see also
GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-5 (Confederate flags to be "preserved for all time in the capitol as priceless mementos of the cause they represented and of the heroism and patriotism of the men who bore them.").
11a SeeGA. CODEANN. §§ 50-3-4, 50-3-4.1; Miss.
CODEANN. § 37-13-5.
19 SeeMIss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-5.
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flags' desecration. 20 These laws suggest that the state legislatures
view the flags as important parts of public life and essential elements
of good citizenship. The requirement that Mississippi public schools
give "a course of study" in the national and state flags, including "the
history of each flag and what they [sic] represent and the proper respect therefor," 2' in the same law that requires that the public
schools teach "the duties and obligations of citizenship, patriotism,
Americanism and respect for and obedience to law,"'" strongly suggests that, in the view of the Mississippi legislature, all of those elements-history, citizenship, patriotism, and the flag-are tied together in ways that require them all to be a part of a child's civics
education.'"
Public symbolism has profound implications for the citizens of2
the public body represented by the symbol. As Berlant suggests,
public symbols serve to inscribe citizens into the state for which the
symbol stands. For a public symbol to perform this function, it must
advance a message that speaks inclusively to the citizenry. If a symbol represents a message of exclusion, rather than inclusion, it will
deny those excluded full participation in public life; in Berlant's
terms, it will leave them with a sense of physical vulnerability, alienation, and displacement." To paraphrase the Supreme Court's Johnson opinion, if a public symbol produces disunity, rather than unity,
26
it will not "knit" loyalty and identity-it will cause them to unravel.
To evaluate the impact of a public symbol, it is therefore essential to understand its effect on the public it represents. Symbols like
flags do not, however, lend themselves to easy interpretation. Flags
operate in ways that are simultaneously communicative and symbolic; they perform their functions as public symbols by communicating a message, or a set of messages, to the public that views them.
120

See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-9; Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-7-39 (both prohibiting abuse

of federal, state, or Confederate flags). These statutes are probably unconstitutional
underJohnson. See 491 U.S. 379.
121 MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-5.
122 Id.
123 While many states have laws requiring the display of both national and state
flags and requiring students to pledge allegiance to and study the American flag,
Georgia and Mississippi appear to be unusual in mandating a pledge of allegiance
to their state flags and, in Mississippi, requiring their study. Cf Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 158.175(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (requiring instruction in display of and respect
for United States and Kentucky flags); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-202(A) (Michie 1997)
(requiring instruction in history of United States and Virginia flags).
See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
126 Se Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989).
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To this extent, the analysis of public symbols is similar to the
analysis of linguistic systems. A brief discussion of semiotics, the
study of linguistic signs, may therefore prove helpful. Semiotics examines language as a system of "signifiers" and "signifieds." Signifiers are linguistic signs (typically words); signifieds are the meanings
associated with them. Language has meaning to us because we associate signifiers (words) with signifieds (meanings) in a common fashion. '
The signifier and signified are inseparable; Ferdinand de Saussure has compared them to the two sides of a sheet of paper. 28 Signifiers have no meaning outside of their relationships with signifieds.
Without an associated concept to give it communicative meaning,
1 a
signifier is merely a random sound or a formless mark on a page. 2
The relationship between signifiers and signifieds is developed
through usage and custom, not through some essential and immutable connection. Linguistic meaning is a product of social and historical forces that give rise to common understandings about the relationships between signifiers and signifieds.'-" Because of this, the
relationship between signifiers and signifieds is essentially arbitrary
and is always subject to change.' 3' This also means that signifiers can
easily become ambiguous, subject to multiple interpretations.'"2
A flag may be seen as a signifier, the associated signified of
which is the organization or entity for which it stands. The United
States is the signified associated with the signifier of the American
flag; a state flag is a signifier representing the set of geographic, social, political, and cultural interests that make up that state.
Signifiers are indeterminate. Thus, their function and effect
cannot be understood except in relationship to the signifieds with
which they are associated. Analyzing this relationship is much more
difficult in the context of public symbols than when applied to linguistic systems. Political and social identity are complicated and elu27
'"

See generally FERDINAND
See id. at 115.

DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(1915).

I" See id. at 67-70.

130 See id. at 71-74; JONATHAN
[hereinafter CULLER, FERDINAND

CuT I ER, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE

13-14 (1977)

DE SAUSSURE]; JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRrlcIsM AFrER STRUCrURALISM 96 (1982) [hereinafter
CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION].
13s See CULLER, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, supra note 130, at 10-15; SAUSSURE, supra

note 127, at 74-77. See generally BILL BRYSON, MADE IN AMERICA: AN INFORMAL
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1994).
132
See CULLER, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, supra note 130, at 10-15;

see also infranote
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sive; the role of public symbols as signifiers is considerably more
complex than that of the symbols that make up language. The state
is even less of a unified, coherent entity than most signifieds, so the
official public act of embodying the state through an officially mandated public symbol has profound implications at both a political
and personal level. The establishment of a public symbol creates not
just a signifier-signified relationship, but a delicate harmony of state,
symbol, and individual citizen.
This harmony, as Berlant suggests, is part of the process of defining what the state is. 1

3

In the context of public symbols, there-

fore, signifier and signified inform one another. The symbol has no
meaning outside of that meaning it acquires as a symbol for the
state. At the same time, however, the symbol, and its connotations,
play a role in the public's understanding of the state.' The public
symbol and the political entity it represents are inseparable and give
one another meaning.
This is made all the more difficult by the inherent ambiguity of
symbols like flags. As evidenced by the disputes over flag burning
and over the Confederate flag, flags can serve as symbols for the way
in which individuals disagree about what the state should be, as well
as symbols of society's common beliefs. '" Because public symbols
play a communicative role, the interpretation of such ambiguities
has much in common with the interpretation of ambiguous speech.
Once again, a consideration of the study of language is helpful.
In examining a listener's interpretation of speech that is inherently ambiguous, Stanley Fish has suggested that the listener's understanding of context is essential." Who the speaker is and the circumstances under which a statement is made are crucial to a
listener's interpretation of a message that has the potential to carry
more than one meaning.
The listener's interpretation of an ambiguous message will be powerfully influenced by the listener's own
knowledge, experience, and position, and by the listener's under133

See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.

34

See CuLLER, FERDINAND DESAUSSURE, supra note

135

130, at 15-18.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417 (1989); Spence v. Washington,

418 U.S. 405, 413 (1974) ("It might be said that we all draw something from our
national symbol, for it is capable of conveying simultaneously a spectrum of mean-

ings."); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943); see also
Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1199
(1998).
136

See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A

PRETIVE
COMMUNIIES 310 (1980)
137

See id. at 312.

TEXT

IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORriY OF INTER-
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standing of who the speaker is and the context in which the speaker
speaks." 8
Applying Fish's model to the role of a public symbol, it is clear
that while a multiplicity of meaning is inevitable for most symbols,39
understanding a symbol's effect on a particular citizen requires consideration of who that citizen is, that citizen's relationship to the
government that adopted the symbol, and the message that the government sought to express through the symbol.
This dynamic may be found at work in the Supreme Court's flag
burning cases. InJohnson, the Court recognized context as crucial to
the interpretation of communicative acts.' The Court went on to
reflect that its conclusion that an act of alleged flag desecration in
Spence v. Washingtonl was protected speech was based in large part
on the context in which the act occurred: "In Spence, for example,
we emphasized that Spence's taping of a peace sign to his flag was
'roughly simultaneous with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy.'' 4 Spence's act, therefore, can only
be fully understood in light of its historical and politi43
cal context.
State display of a public symbol sets up a complex interrelationship of state, symbol, and citizen. The identity of each, and its past
relationship with the others, will powerfully influence the interplay
among the three. In a nation based on the principle that the citizens are-at a fundamental level-the state, public symbols must
function in an evenhanded and inclusive manner if they are to treat
all citizens equally.

In See id. at 320-21.
9

See supra notes 132, 135.

See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405 ("We have not automatically
concluded, however,
that any action taken with respect to our flag is expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment purposes, we have considered the context in
which it occurred."); see also Spence, 418 U.S. at 410 ("Moreover, the context in
which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important, for the context may
give meaning to the symbol.").
40

141 418 U.S. 405 (1974).

:

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410).
See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410; see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
320
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The idea expressed by a particular act of flag
burning is necessarily dependent on the temporal and political context in which it
occurs.").
0
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Analyzing Public Symbols Under Hunter

The function of a public symbol like a state flag is to express
symbolically an understanding of what the state is.1 " Through that
symbolism, the flag will either serve to bring the state's citizens together, or to separate them. Either way, the effect of the symbol on a
class of citizens cannot be divorced from the intent that fueled the
adoption of the symbol. 45 Flags do not serve to bar the curtain to
the voting booth or the door to the schoolhouse. To the extent that
a flag has a "measurable" effect, that effect is purely symbolic. If the
message a flag symbolizes is discriminatory, then the effect of that
flag is discriminatory.1 "
No symbol has a single, discrete meaning. Multiplicity of interpretation, however, will not rob a public symbol of its significance.
The flag burning cases exemplify the reality that even the most potent and unifying of symbols can be open to multiple interpretations.' 47 Meaning is elusive and lacks firm definition.1 Symbols can
have vastly different meanings to different people;

49

they can also

have meanings that change radically over time.)
The relevant inquiry in examining the meaning of a public symbol for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes will be one of disparate impact: What message does the symbol convey to members of a protected group?
As the Supreme Court has made clear, racially motivated laws
that have a disparate impact on Blacks violate the Equal Protection
Clause, even if they are facially neutral.' 5' Although the rebel flag
See supra Part III.A (discussing the role of public symbols).
,45See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
46 The importance of this act of public symbolism is underscored
by states' insistence that the state and national flags be displayed, saluted, and studied in the public schools. Seesupra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
147 See generally Eichman, 496 U.S. 310; Johnson, 491 U.S. 397; see also Spence,
418
:44

U.S. 405.

See CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 130, at 130-34.
Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1997) ("We recognize that
the Georgia flag conveys mixed meanings; to some it honors those who fought in
the Civil War and to others it flies as a symbol of oppression."), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1199 (1998).
150 See SAUSSURE, supra note 127, at 74-76 (discussing the evolution
of linguistic
signs); see also infra note 169 and accompanying text.
Symbols can also be subverted. A South Carolina rap group, da Phlayva, has
advanced what it calls the "New South" flag: the Confederate battle flag, but in the
red, green, and black of a Black Liberation flag. See Mike Smith, Banner Combines
ConjederateFlag, Colors of Black Liberation, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 22, 1994, at A4.
See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985);' Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); see also Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
148

149 See

918

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:897

lacks a universally agreed-upon offensive meaning, its incorporation
into a state flag violates the Fourteenth Amendment so long as it intentionally conveys a meaning that is disproportionately offensive to
Blacks.
As discussed above,
the act of interpretation necessary for
such an analysis must take into account the context in which the
symbol was adopted. The importance of context is illustrated by an
example proposed by Professor Sanford Levinson. In arguing that
the Confederate flag cannot be equated with the system of chattel
slavery, Levinson focuses on the question of context: "'Meet me at
the bank' is fatally ambiguous unless we know whether the speaker is
interested in money or swimming."' Although Levinson argues that
this indeterminacy undermines the notion that the flag has a discriminatory impact, his example underscores that to understand an
act of communication, we must place it in context. The ambiguity of
the Confederate battle flag is lost when its incorporation into the
Georgia and Mississippi state flags is considered in light of the surrounding facts. The legislative actions adopting the flags took place
in both cases during periods of racial confrontation in which both
legislatures sought to deny Blacks fundamental rights.'-" Taken in
context, these clearly are symbols intended to communicate a message of exclusion, disenfranchisement, and separateness. 5
It is clear, moreover, that the rebel flag is perceived by many to
carry a discriminatory message. The flag has been adopted as the
symbol of avowedly racist groups' and often flies at the center of
controversies involving racial discrimination. 5 7 A recent national

:52

See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.

153 Levinson, supra note 18, at
1102.

See supraPart II.B.1 (outlining racial motivation).
See supraPart II.B.1 (discussing racial motivation).
56
See Forman, supra note 18, at 513 & n.57 (listing numerous examples taken
from newspaper articles); Applebome, supra note 2, at A16 ("White supremacist
54

155

groups such as the Ku Klux Klan have long adopted the battle flag ... ."); Bigots
Bolder Since Verdict, PastorSays, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 10, 1995, at B2; Roxana Hege-

man, Klan Cable Access Show Leads NAACP to Take Legal Action, DET. FREE PRESS, Feb.
8, 1996, at 5C.
157 See, e.g., Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026,
1028 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("The display of Confederate flags in [the Black plaintiffs] work area had the effect of saying
to him and fellow employees that he was not accepted as an engineer on the same
basis and with the same professional status as White engineers."); United States v.
ThreeJuveniles, 886 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. Mass. 1995) (Confederate flag displayed
by defendants during race-based intimidation ofJews and Blacks); Bell v. Mike Ford
Realty Co., 857 F. Supp. 1550, 1559 (S.D. Ala. 1994) (allegation of discrimination in
sale of real estate: "When the plaintiff Bell and his wife visited the Point Clear
property, Mrs. Bell 'observed that a neighbor... was flying a Confederate flag and

1998]

STAINED FLAGS

919

poll by the Washington Post found that a majority of Blacks-and a
substantial minority of Whites-see the official use of the rebel flag
by state and local government as inappropriate. " Many commentators, including stalwart defenders of southern culture, acknowledge
that "Confederate symbols-flags, monuments, and so on-all too
easily exclude large numbers of citizens, most notably blacks.""
The divisiveness of the flag is evidenced by the efforts of two
conservative southern governors to remove it from places of public
symbolism. Georgia Governor Zell Miller, whose great-grandfather
was wounded at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg fighting for the
Confederacy, engaged in a politically unpopular (and ultimately unsuccessful) campaign in 1992 to have the rebel flag removed from
Georgia's state flag.' 60 Miller argued that the rebel flag is "a racially
charged, divisive symbol," representing bigotry, not southern heritage.'6' More recently, South Carolina's Republican Governor, David
Beasley, made a controversial proposal to stop flying the rebel flag
over the state house. 2 Citing the Ku Klux Klan's misuse of the flag,
Beasley argued that the flag fails to honor Confederate soldiers and
remarked to [Mr.] Bell that someone was sending him a message.'"); Denmon v.
Runyon, No. CIV.A.92-2144-EEO, 1994 WL 186049, at *10 (D. Kan. Apr. 26, 1994)
(clothing depicting Confederate flag part of alleged pattern of racial harassment);
State v. Wynne, 406 S.E.2d 812, 815-16 (N.C. 1991) (display of flag involved in racially motivated killing); State v. Atkins, 399 S.E.2d 760, 763 (S.C. 1990) (pattern of
racial disputes leading up to murder included defendant's flying the Confederate
flag on Independence Day); Curtis & Winton, supra note 4, at A8 (flag displayed at
reputed neo-Nazi house); Dorothy Gilliam, When Hate Moves in Next Door, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 16, 1995, at B1 (display of flag part of pattern of racial harassment); Two
Black Teenagers, supra note 5, at A6 (display of flag incites racial killing).
15 See Eugene Robinson, Black and White and Getting By: Between Hatred and Racial Harmony Is Linevile, Ala., Where Few Have It Easy, WASH. PosT, July 15, 1996, at
A], A10. The poll asked: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
There should be no official use of the Confederate Flag by state and local governments--for instance in state flags or over state buildings." Id. The results displayed
by percentage of those "who agree" were as follows:
37%
Outside the South
Overall In the South 34%
34%
Outside the South
Whites In the South 30%
68%
Outside the South
Blacks In the South 57%
Id.
1
Akhil Reed Amar, Civil Religion and Its Discontent, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1153, 1166
n.76 (1989); see a/soJOHN SHELTON REED, KICKING BAcK: FURTHER DISPATCHES FROM
THE SOUTH 38-48 (1995);Jeff Dickerson, Georgia's Swastika: On Flag Day, Banner of
fim Crow is Still Waved, ATLANTAJ., Feb. 14, 1996, at Al2.
1W See Applebome, supranote 2, at A16; Smothers, supra note 16, at A12; Ronald
Smothers, South's Emblem to be Retained on GeorgiaFlag: Governor Ends Effort to Remove
War Symbo/ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1993, atA2.
62 Applebome, supranote 2, atA16; see also Smothers, supranote 16, atA12.
See S. CarolinaGovernor's Proposa4 supranote 11, at 19.

920

SETON HALL LA WREVEW

[Vol. 28:897

suggested that it be moved to a Civil War monument. 63 The proposal has stirred an intense and often emotional debate, leading one
opponent in the state legislature to propose that a prominent supporter of removal step down from public office and seek the help of
the Federal Witness Protection Program.'"
Defenders of the Confederate flag often respond to proposals
represents
such as Beasley's and Miller's by arguing that the •flag
65
southern history and heritage, not slavery and racism.
This argument oversimplifies the problem. History, like the flag itself, is easily
turned into a tool of ideology. When we look to history to define
our sense of identity, present notions of identity simultaneously rewrite history (or, as historian David Lowenthal terms it, "history coopted by heritage"), recasting it into terms that serve present political priorities.'" The Confederate flag represents a prime example of
this dynamic. Adopted as a symbol by racist groups like the Ku Klux
Klan, 67 the rebel flag has come to be regarded as emblematic of the
South's troubled history of race relations. This may be contrasted
with other symbols of the Confederacy. Georgia Governor Miller's
campaign to change the state flag16 8 called for a return to the Georgia
flag of 1905. Although both the 1905 and the 1956 flags were based
on Confederate banners, they carry very different connotations today:
[B] lack supporters of a change in design said they did not oppose
the Governor's plan to return to the 1905 design, despite its evocation of the Confederacy. Mr. Shinholster [of the NAACP] said
that the Confederate battle flag with its St. Andrew's Cross was
truly the more incendiary symbol for blacks because of its associa169
tion with the Ku Klux Klan and segregationist resistance.
163 See id.
164

See S.C. Official Derided on Flag Issue: Lawmaker Suggests Education Chief Seek Fed-

eral Protection, WASH. PosT, Dec. 29, 1996, at All; see also Chris Buritt, S. Carolina's
Battle Over Its Confederate Flag is a '90s-Style Civilized War, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1996, at
2; Michael A. Fletcher, Governor Seeks to Move Confederate Flag: S.C. Republican Would
Shift Banner From Statehouse to Memorials, WASH. PosT, Nov. 27, 1996, at A3; Goodfor
the Governor, ROCK HILL HERALD, Nov. 29, 1996, at 9A.

See supra note 17, and infta notes 159-63 and accompanying text (detailing the
proposals of both Miller and Beasley).
See David Lowenthal, Identity, Heritage and History, in COMMEMORATIONS: THE
PoLrrics OF NATIONAL IDENTnY 48, 53 (John R. Gillis ed., 1994).
:67 See supra note 156.
168
See supranotes 160-161 and accompanying text.
69
Smothers, supra note 16, at A12. Reliance on history in defense of contemporary uses of the Confederate flag is problematic also in light of the traditional marginalization of Blacks' role in the Civil War, as evidenced by their absence in
monuments and memorials. See Kirk Savage, The Politics of Memory: Black Emancipa165

1998]

STAINED FLAGS

As the Coleman court freely acknowledges, the rebel flag fails as a
unifying symbol."0 While this failure does not in and of itself violate
equal protection,"' it leads us to the question of disparate impact:
Does it act to exclude Black citizens? If the effect of a flag, as Berlant
argues, is to unify, to inscribe citizens in the National (or State)
Symbolic," 2 a flag that disproportionately (and deliberately) bars
Blacks from full participation in public life violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It is clear that the Confederacy's battle flag serves to divide residents of the South along racial lines. Fiercely pro-southern commentator John Shelton Reed has recognized that the incorporation
of the rebel flag in the Georgia state flag acts to exclude Black Georgians: "[I]t seems to me that trying to make all true Southerners salute the Confederate flag excludes altogether too many people who
have a right to the label and who could be valuable recruits to the
cause."'7 Another southern academic, William R. Ferris, the Director
of the University of Mississippi's Center for the Study of Southern
Culture,
calls the flag "the most inflammatory symbol that the South
174
has."
Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, while concluding that Georgia's inclusion of the Confederate flag in its state flag does not violate equal protection, condemns
its display as divisive:
We recognize that the Georgia flag conveys mixed meanings; to
some it honors those who fought in the Civil War and to others it
flies as a symbol of oppression. But because the Confederate batte flag emblem offends many Georgians, it has, in our view, no
place in the official state flag. We regret that the Georgia legislature has chosen, and continues to display, as an official state symbol a battle flag emblem that divides rather than unifies the citizens of Georgia.
The Coleman court is clearly troubled by the inappropriateness
of the Confederate battle flag as public symbol. Feeling itself nonetion and the Civil War Monument, in COMMEMORATIONS, supra note 166, at 127, 135-36.
170 See Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1199 (1998).
171 Considering the facts of cases like Johnson and Spence, such an interpretation
would condemn the American flag as well. See supra note 147 and accompanying
text.
7

See supranotes 105-09 and accompanying text.

73 REED, supra note 159, at 42.

Kevin Sack, Symbol of the Old South Divides the New South, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21,
1996, at 5.
175 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530.
174
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theless constrained by the state of the record before it and the conventional limits on the adjudication of equal protection cases, 76 the
court of appeals declined to consider the implications of this discomfort for its analysis of the flag's effect as a public symbol.
James Forman, Jr. offers a moving testament to the flag's effect
on Black southerners in his critique of the Eleventh Circuit's 1990
decision rejecting a challenge to Alabama's display of the rebel flag
over the state capitol. 7 7 Forman describes his own experience as a
Black teenager in Atlanta, watching the Black groundskeeper at his
high school raising the Georgia flag, with its Confederate emblem:
I think of the incongruity of having black children, in a largely
black city, watch a black man raise the symbol of the Confederacy
for us all to honor. I tell myself to laugh, hoping that this will
keep me from crying. But I cannot laugh, and I dare not cry, so I
close my eyes and try to forget. If I could just forget. My eyes
close tightly, my fists clench, and I slowly force from my mind images of the flag, of the Ku Klux Klan, of Bull Conner and George
Wallace-of black people in chains, hanging from trees, kept illiterate, denied the opportunity to vote. 178
The Georgia state flag, through its incorporation of the Confederate battle flag, did not serve to bring Forman into the fold of
public life. By conveying a message of intolerance, it acted instead to
exclude him, to remind him of the subordinate role that Blacks have
traditionally been forced into in the South. Instead of symbolizing a
society in which he can be a member, it symbolizes a society in which
he would have been a second-class citizen as a result of his race. Exclusion of this sort has no place in a nation that demands equality;
Georgia's imposition of such exclusion on its Black citizens through
its use of a discriminatory symbol denies them the equal protection
of the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The adoption of a public symbol carries profound implications
for the government that chooses it and the public that it is intended
to represent. It is an act fundamentally different from the private
display of the same symbol 179 or the inclusion of that symbol in a mu176

See id. at 530-31.

See Forman, supra note 18, at 505-06 (discussing NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d
1555 (11 th Cir. 1990)). Alabama has since discontinued this practice. See Confeder177

ate FlagRemoved, supra note 14, at A47.
178

Forman, supra note 18, at 526.

179

The adoption of a flag as a public symbol is distinct from the display of a flag
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seum display.'80 Governmental display of a symbol, particularly when
the symbol is put forth as one that officially represents all citizens,
constitutes a unique form of "state speech."'8" Like the state display
of religious icons, the choice of a public symbol will serve either to
include or exclude citizens from full participation in public life.
When the state defines itself in terms that are discriminatory and divisive, the victims of that discrimination will be of marginal utility,
left to feel unwelcome and unfree.
Discrimination of this sort cannot survive equal protection scrutiny. Where the state acts with discriminatory intent to adopt a biased and divisive public symbol, that action violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. The incorporation of the Confederate battle flag into
the Georgia and Mississippi state flags constitutes just such discrimination, projecting a message of segregation and intolerance inconsistent with the notion of equal rights. Both flags were adopted with
an intent to send a discriminatory message,'85 and both serve to deny
Blacks an equal place in public life.' 84 Both are unconstitutional.

by a private citizen. As such, distinguishing the analysis of public symbols under the
Fourteenth Amendment from the analysis of more traditional law-making, see supra
Part III.A, does not contradict the principle that, for First Amendment purposes,
there is no "separate juridical category" for flags. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 417-18 (1989).
180 See Levinson, supra note 18, at 1105-06.
181 See id. at 1117.
182
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580-84 (1992); ACLU v. Schundler,
104 F.3d 1435, 1437 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Doe v. County of Montgomery, 41 F.3d
1156, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving courthouse sign that read, "THE WORLD
NEEDS GOD"); Edith Stanley, Judge's Plaqueat Center of Lawsuit Over Christianityand
the Courts, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1996, at A20; Morning Edition: Illinois Town Fights
ACLU Order to Take Down Sign (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 1, 1996). Although such
cases are analyzed generally under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause,
the state display of religious icons also represents a violation of equal protection, for
much the same reasons advanced above regarding the rebel flag. See Michael A.
Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NoTRE DAME L. Rzv. 311, 313-15 (1986); see also supra
Part III.B (analyzing public symbols under Hunter).
,83 See supraPart II.B. 1 (discussing racial motivation).
184 See supraPart III.B (analyzing public symbols under Hunter).
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Figure 1. Confederate battle flag

Figure 2. State flag of Georgia

Figure 3. State flag of Mississippi

